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Carlin: Procedure and Forms of Common Law Pleading
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
record. Our traditional forms of procedure probably need no
fundamental change. The problem is to meet the elusive human
factor in a system of good laws administered by fallible men.
Surely this factor cannot be legislated out of existence. Nor can it
be obscured by the idealistic description of the system as a government of laws and not of men. An anti-lynching sentiment will,
when the millennium arrives, make the sequel to the present record
a converse expression of the desires of men expressed in the administration of their laws."
Without waiting for the betterment of social relations he then
goes on to show what improvement might be made in our present
statutes to reduce the number of lynchings; he very carefully
shows existing legislative attempts including Federal, and concludes with a Model act which briefly summarized suggests:
a. Penalizing the county in which the lynching occurs for
the benefit of the estate of the victim, and allowing the
county to recover against the participants.
b. Removal of police officer for cause and declaring him
permanently ineligible for public office.
c. Provisions for changing of venue and amending rules of
evidence.
The reviewer's only adverse criticism would be that the appendix
containing the existing legislation is rather lengthy if not unnecessary.
This volume shows a painstaking, understanding study of a
most difficult social problem, suggests an intelligent attack of that
problem, and will be valuable for reference and serve as a model
for students who in the future when more data is available, desire
to continue a study so ably begun in such a scholarly fashion.
-JimEs B. BLACKBURN.
University of Pittsburgh School of Law.

PROCEDURE AND FORMS ComtoN LAW PrIMANG. By Roger
O'Donnell. Washington, D. C.: National Law Book Company.
1934. Pp. xx, 459.
This volume appears to have been prepared primarily for
students as a compendium of a more elaborate work designed for
use by practitioners. The first part deals with the forms of action,
the principles of pleading and a bit of procedure, including within
the compass of 283 pages the following 29 chapters: Historical
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Development of Pleading; The Formulary System and Theory of
the Case; The Classification of Actions; The Action of Covenant;
The Action of Debt; The Action of Detinue; The Action of
Replevin; The Action of Trespass; The Action 'on the Case; The
Action of Trover; The Action of Assumpsit; The Action of Ejectment; Joinder and Election of Actions; Parties to Actions; Procedure to an Action; The Syllogistic Nature of Pleading; The Composition of Pleadings; Duplicity; Plural Counts; Venue; Pleading
Time, Quantity, Quality and value, Names, etc; Dilatory Pleas;
Demurrers; Defensive Pleadings; Title and Authority; New Assignment, Protestation, Departure, etc; The Retrospective Motions;
Attachment and Garnishment; Service of Process and Quashing
Same. The second part, 163 pages, comprises a collection of forms
applying to the various forms of action.
By way of comparing his efforts with Mr. Stephen's classic
work, the author says: " ... . Stephen wrote both as a historian
and a guide and his work was prepared for use by Oxford students who had become accustomed to such a compendious form
of expression that every word was made to assume its full meaning; it can hardly be said that such attentive reading as that re4uired of the Oxonian is practiced by the average student of today, and in this volume there has been a studied effort to state
each and every proposition in simple language and to clothe the
treatment of the subject with such a garment of simplicity as to
make it less difficult to grasp the principles and learn to apply
them without devoting too much time to an effort to understand
the intricacies of explanation or expression."
Apropos this statement (which it is to be hoped is not an echo
from any such slogan as "common law pleading simplified"), it
must be conceded that the author certainly has succeeded in expressing himself forcibly and clearly and displays a peculiar knack
for explaining the operation of a technical principle in nontechnical terms; but one may be permitted to question whether
his comparison is accurate and just. He certainly does not intend
to imply that he has consciously used words without the intention
that they shall convey their "full meaning". As to any parsimony
of words that might result from terseness of phraseology, it certainly may be reflected that the author himself could not afford
to indulge in any superfluity of statement in undertaking to deal
with 29 such chapters within the compass of 283 pages. Anent the
historical approach, it may be doubted whether, in the ancient
subject of Common Law Pleading, any expositor can be an ade-
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quate "guide" -without also being to a liberal extent a historian,
the truth of which proposition is exemplified in the author's own
method of treatment. Finally, it may be doubted whether any student, Oxonian or otherwise, can acquire a knowledge of Common
Law Pleading without the most diligent study, not to mention
"attentive reading". In fact, one of the predominant characteristics of the author's style is his aptitude for expressing himself so
concisely and precisely that his entire meaning is concentrated in
a single terse phrase or word. It is his ability to conserve words
and to pack a large measure of substance into a small space that
saves his work from a possible charge that it is merely a glorified
"black-letter" text.
No attempt can be made to go into a detailed commentary
on the merits of the various topics in the 29 chapters. It is perhaps
superfluous to say that there is nothing new in substance, the
only room for novelty in such a subject being in the method of
treatment. In spite of the fact that the author condemns the ease
method as a primary method of teaching the subject, his citations,
where authorities are cited at all, are confined almost exclusively
to cases from Keigwin's, Sunderland's and MeBaine's cases. So
extensively are the cases from Keigwin cited, that the volume, at a
glance, might be taken as a supplement to the case book. A feature
which will be urged by some as an annoying defect is the fact
that no authorities are cited at all for a multitude of statements,
some of which would seem to need substantiation. It frequently is
impossible to determine whether a proposition is intended as a
statement of established, adjudicated principle, or as a deduction
or illustration sponsored wholly by the author.
The text is not wholly free from the charge of inaccuracy;
and a few propositions which are subject to controversy are stated
dogmatically. The following are submitted briefly as illustrations:
Assumption (pp. 10-11) that the action on the case did not exist
prior to the Statute of Westminster (Plucknett contra). Assumption (p. 21), that personal actions are only concerned with
a property right. The old fallacy that a seal imports a consideration (pp. 27, 35). Statement (p. 28) that it is always sufficient
to lay a breach in the language of the covenant. Statement (p. 30)
that, in debt, "The money sued for is a segregated, individual
body of money, identified as the property of the plaintiff". Statement (p. 42) that, in debt on a judgment, "the damage consists
of the full amount of the judgment", with interest. Statement
(p. 44) that, "As expanded beyond its original scope, detinue may
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be employed to recover a chattel unlawfully held by a wrong-doer,
even though the original taking was lawful" (likely inadvertent).
Statement (p. 47) that, in detinue, "The damages are ordinarily
measured by the value of the goods as found by the jury". Apparent assumption (p. 54), contradicted in later text, that all
actions in trespass are confined to (1) violence to the person, (2)
de bonis asportatisor (3) Quare clausum Fregit.Statement (p. 77)
that in actions for libel or slander "The 'colloquium' is the defamatory statement itself" and the innuendo serves "to connect
those words with antecedent statements in the declaration". Statement (p. 96) that Special Assumpsit developed after General Assumpsit (Ames contra). Statement (p. 188) that "Misjoinder or
non-joinder of parties plaintiff or defendant must be pleaded in
abatement". Statement (p. 223) that the general issue is very narrow in all cases except trover, case and assumpsit, later contradicted (e. g., on p. 234 as to debt). Assumption (pp. 229, 259)
that the plea of liberum tenementum is always a sham plea. Statement (p. 273) that a motion in arrest of judgment, sustained,
always terminates the case. As to Latin phraseology, see (pp. 93,
126) "cum personam" and (p. 138) "in propria personam".
Some of the author's observations on matters of history seem
to be novel. Here again there is a lack of citations and it does not
appear whether he has made independent research, is stating
conclusions reached by others, or is reaching too facile conclusions
of his own by way of deduction from well known generalities.
The author states that the forms in the second part of the
volume have been taken from Maryland, District of Columbia
and Virginia precedents. Collaboration of John A. Bresnahan of
the District of Columbia Bar in preparation of the forms is
acknowledged. Sources of the forms are not cited "because they
are not considered necessary to the purposes of this work". Why?
Because it is intended for students? Even if students should not
be interested in these sources, is it not likely that instructors
would be interested?
-LEO CARLIN.
West Virginia University.

THE HousE OF ADAm SMITH. By Eli Ginsberg. New York:
Columbia University Press. 1934. Pp. 267.
This book attempts in Part One "to reconstruct and interpret
the Wealth of Nations without constant recourse to direct quo-
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